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I. Summary
The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure are compatible with
jury trial, as in the American common law system, and also with the
nonjury trial procedures in other common law systems and in the civil
law systems. From a comparative law perspective, it is instructive to
consider the procedural virtues of the jury system, which are often
ignored, while also considering the off-voiced criticisms of the jury
system. These procedural virtues include ones that are "mechanical" but
nevel1heless important.
II. Introduction
The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure recognize that jury
trial is generally a matter of right in civil litigation in the United States.
but is unheard of in civil litigation in the civil law systems and is used
* Thomas E. Miller Distinguished Professor of Law. University of California
Hasting.s College of Law
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only in limited circumstances in other common law systems. This
circumstance poses many interesting issues, some of a technical nature
and others of more fundamental character. The Principles therefore
provoke academic and professional consideration of important issues
concerning administration and adjudication in civil justice. This essay is
a partial introduction to these issues.
III. Jury Trial with Comprehensive Pretrial Discovery
American lawyers of the present generation presuppose that
comprehensive pretrial discovery is available in jury cases. This
presupposition rests on the following propositions:
• The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for discovery
through party and witness depositions, disclosure of'
documents, and interrogatories including demand for
admissions. l
• The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is not limited
to admissible evidence, but extends to matter "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.,,2
• The pleading requirements under the Federal Rules include a
very broad definition of relevance;' thereby placing on Iy
broad limits on the issues regarding which evidence might be
admissible.
• The prevailing judicial attitude in administration of the
federal discovery rules has been latitudinarian, allowing
discovery without much external restraint.
• Under the Federal Rules, no differentiation is made between
jury cases and nonjury cases so far as breadth of discovery is
concerned.
• The same general pattern exists in most all states, inasmuch
as most have adopted discovery rules patterned on the
Federal Rules.
There is restraint in use of discovery in most civil cases in American
litigation.4 However, restraint evidently is a function of cost
1. See Fed. R. Civ. P 26.
2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I).
3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
4. See Thomas E. Willging, A 11 Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
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considerations taken into account by the advocates, particularly in cases
involving limited amounts. In most "routine" cases, discovery will
address only a few witnesses and a few documents. In "big cases," those
having high monetary or socio-political stakes, extensive discovery is the
norm.
IV. Jury Trial with Very Limited Discovery
Comprehensive discovery was not the norm in previous generations.
Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, discovery was tightly
limited.~ In many states depositions were permitted only of immediate
parties or of witnesses who would be unavailable for trial, for example,
because of terminal illness. In some states the restrictions on party
depositions were even tighter. Discovery of documents was generally
limited to documents clearly relevant to the dispute and which could tJe
specifically identified. Moreover, in most jurisdictions a distinction was
maintained between actions at law (in which jury trial was guaranteed)
and suits in equity (in which jury was not generally available). Within
that ancient framework, the procedure of discovery was associated with
suits in equity, whereas the tradition in actions at law was that of no
discovery. Statutes permitting discovery were interpreted against that
tradition.
Perhaps equally important, the bench and bar of the pre- 1938 era
considered that discovery was exceptional. Indeed, disclosure of
evidence before trial was generally considered an invasion of privacy, or,
worse, an invasion of the lawyer-client relationship or the lawyer's
professional identity. A residue of that orientation is evident in the
famous case of Hickman v. Taylor6 where the courts were startled to
confront the implications of the broad scope of Rule 26(b)(2). The
response was invention of the work product evidentiary privilege.
Very limited pretrial discovery was thus the American procedural
norm in jury triable cases prior to the Federal Rules. And it Vias in that
legal milieu that the constitutional guaranties of jury trial were adopted.
The federal jury trial guaranty was established in the Seventh
Amendment, adopted in the Bill of Rights in 1791. The counterpal1 state
guarantees were adopted at various dates, some prior to the Seventh
Amendment, others still later as the states in the West were settled and
then brought into the Union. However, as far as I have been able to
PraCTice Under The j 993 Federal Rule AmendmenTs, 39 S.c. L. REV. 525 (l9~)
5. Set' generally James Fleming. Jr., Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929): rl.l:MIl\G
.lAi\1f'S. JR .. (JEOrFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF. CIVIL PROCI:Dl.;RF (5th ed
2001)
6 Si!l' I!ickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (j947).
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detelllllnc, all of the states except Hawaii and Alaska adopted their
constitutional guaranties of jury trial when their contemporary procedural
regimes were based on the old tradition of very limited discovery. And,
prior to 1938, the federal coulis employed those state procedures under
the mandate of the Conformity Act. 7 Thus both state and federal COlLrts
prior to \938 conducted jury trials on the basis of very limited discovery.
V. The Propriety of Discovery in Modem Civil Litigation
This is not to say that the old pre-1938 regime was as things should
be.
Substantial pretrial discovery is, in my opinion, a necessary and
proper element of modem civil litigation. One of the notable features of
the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure is recognition of this
element, through procedures for pretrial "disclosure" of evidence. 8
"Disclosure" is a less intimidating term than "discovery," because the
latter can signify the wide-open variety experienced in some litigation in
this country.
In particular, substantial scope for discovery of documents is
justified by the fact that typical transactions in today's world involve
bureaucratic (or legal entity) interactions: individuals dealing with
government agencies and otlicials, or with bureaucratized business
enterprises; bureaucratized business enterprises dealing with government
agencies, or dealing with each other; etc. Documents are the
manifestations of the bureaucratic process, government and private
entities. In modern commercial litigation, depositions ordinarily
supplement and illuminate the documents.
Hence, the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure contemplate
and provide for substantial pretrial discovery in all commercial civil
litigation, whether the ultimate trial is before a jury (as in the American
system) or before a judge or judges without a jury, as in virtually all
other modem legal systems.
VI. The Significance of Jury Trial
So what is the special significance ofjury trial in civil cases, ifany?
The response to this question can be considered as an exploration of
a peculiar American procedural trope. It can also be considered as a
comparison of the various presuppositions about procedural justice that
prevail in modem legal systems. Such a comparison fully pursued would
7. See Stephen B. Burbank. The Rules Enabling Act 0/ /934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015([982).
8. Principle 16 "Access to Infonnation and Evidence." ALI/UN/DROfT
Principles o[Transnatiollof Ci"if Procedure (2004).
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lead to the depths, or height, of jurisprudence. Almost a half-century ago
Professors Hany Kalven and Hans Zeisel pursued that inquiry in their
. 9
monumental study, The American .furv.
Probably the most basic issue concerning jUly trial is the issue that
Kalven and Zcisel put front and center: Vv'hat difference is there between
verdicts reached in jUly trials and the determinations that were or would
be made by a judge addressing the sallle evidence'?
Kalven and Zeisel gave an exquisite perf0ll11anCe in responding to
this interrogatory. Their basic finding was that juries resolve most cases
about the same way as would a judge, but tend to be more liberal toward
plaintiffs in civil cases and more lenient toward defendants in criminal
cases. IO We may well wonder \vhether that pattern would still hold
today, particularly in criminal where contemporary juries may be 1110re
"judgmental" toward defendants.
That there are differences between the intellectual apparatus with
which juries address and resolve disputed forensic issues, and that \-'.'ith
which judges address them, seems obvious. Indeed, if there were not
such differences, the whole point of the constitutional guaranties of jury
trial would be moot. Moreover, the substantial unease with which jury
trial is viewed outside the United States would be incoherent. But the
constitutional issue is not moot and neither, in my opinion, is the unease
about jUly abroad incoherent.
Adequately exploring the issue of jury-judge difference would
require consideration of differences between juries and judges in
education, professional training. experience in life generally, class and
economic differences, perhaps regional and religious differences. and
experience in encounters with legal disputation. The latter difference
points to the fact that most judges are veterans in dealing with conflicting
testirnony and disputed interpretations of events. and accordingly
somewhat hardened, \vhile jurors almost always are novices in such
matters. Perhaps it is this difference that is most significant. But
measuring anyone of these dimensions almost defies social-scientific
method, as Kalven and Zeisel recognized.
]n this essay] have a much more modest agenda: To identify an
imp0l1ant "mechanical" difference between jury trial and trial to ,1
professional judiciary.
\) Sec HARRY K.'\LVI·.'< . .lR. & HA'\S /.I.ISII. Till A\'ILRICA'\ JI:RY (1<f6()). Sec "J",
\'\IIRII P 11,,'s & NUL VID'l.1·\R . .lLI)(j!'\(; Till' .JLRY (I<fX6): !-<.()HIRT I::. l.11\\.
V~I<J)I<J: ASSt--:SSIMj 1'111 CI\II. .lL~RY SYSTL\·j (J 993): 1\iancv.l King..hllT Re.\('al'r'i/ alld
He/firm .llIllIlmdllu!ol7. 79 .Jl"DIC·\TlRI ::: 14 (1996).
1(i Sec Kalvcn. SIIIJ/"(1 !l\)l~ 9.
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VI!. The Mechanical Significance of Jury Trial
Employing juries to decide questions of fact entails at least three
mechanical effects on the conduct of civil litigation. At least one of
these has long been noted: Jury trials typically require more trial time
than the same case would require if tried in the same way to a judge.
Some estimates indicate that the jury trial requires about one and a half
to two times as long as the same trial before a judge. II The di fference
arises from the need to conduct jury selection, including voir dire
examination of prospective jury members; to provide more extensive
preliminary statements by the judge, and perhaps also by the advocates,
describing the case to the prospective and empanelled jurors; to afford
more extensive opening statements and summations by the advocates;
and to permit more methodical, perhaps laborious, presentation of
testimony and exhibits.
However, the comparison here is between a trial to a jury and "the
same trial" before a judge. In fact, it would be unusual that there be "the
same trial." The very measures outlined above that make for a longer
trial in a jury case would not, at least ordinarily, be entailed in a nonjury
case. Hence, the comparison is more or less "apples to oranges."
VIIL More Methodical Presentation
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the same underlying adjudication
typically would require more time if presented to a jury than if presented
to a judge. It is by no means clear, however, that this is a loss of
efficiency or the incursion of additional cost. The more methodical
presentation may simply be a better adaptation of forensic technique.
In particular, a more expedited presentation to the court may be
made on the assumption of a quicker and deeper comprehension on the
judge's part, compared to a jury. But that assumption could be mistaken.
There is an old adage in the common law tradition that a judge often is
essentially a thirteenth juror. Traditionally, this signifies that a judge
understand facts the same way as an ordinary person, and not in any
peculiar "judicial" way. But the adage can also signify that ajudge could
misunderstand the facts in the same way as a juror. That interpretation
would dictate that a presentation to a judge should be as methodical as to
a Jury.
IX. The Concentrated Hearing
In any event there are at least two other mechanical aspects of jury
trial that warrant attention. These aspects flow from the fact that the jury
1l. See id.
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is not constituted of professional judicial officers, but is instead recruited
ad hoc from the other employments. As a concomitant of their service
being part-time and "amateur," members of a jury generally want to get
done with their service. Most jurors regard their service important and
are pleased to have participated, at least if the procedure for summoning
and empanelling them is reasonably efficient. '2 But they have other
things going in their lives.
Hence, the evidence to be presented in a jury trial must be in what is
called in the common law a "trial" and in the civil Jaw a "concentrated
hearing." The typical jury trial lasts about three days. although there are
salient exceptions: Some trials have taken weeks and months, a few
perhaps even a year. However, even long trials generally proceed
continuously and without recess, except for weekends. This model of
continuous hearing governs typical nonjury proceedings in common law
systems. Even when held before a jury without a judge. a common law
plenary hearing is a "trial."
In contrast, the classic civil law proceeding consists of a series of
Sh0l1 hearings, each of which could be, for example. reception of
testimony from one witness. These hearings will be spaced apal1
temporally, week to week, or more commonly, month to month.
Institutional memory traditionally is secured by memoranda to the case
file. If the tribunal is constituted of several judges, that record may be
the only source of evidence available to non-scrivener members of the
panel. If the issues are relatively complex, it may be months or years
before everything in evidence has been received. And the fUJ1her task
remains of preparing a decision, written up by a judge as sole arbiter or
as amanuensis for a panel.
The mechanic of a common law trial is quite different. In a jury
trial, or a judicial trial modeled on such a trial, all the evidence is
received before any of it is subject to official evaluation, Institutional
memory for a jury is the collective recollection of its several members.
and "oral" and "aural" process because jurors by tradition were not
pemlitted even to keep notes. Institutional memory during a trial before
a judge in the common law system is whatever the judge decides to
employ, such as taking notes. In American procedure there is no
requirement of a reasoned decision, by either jury or judge, A jury
simply provides its result, in the fonn of a verdict. A judge is required to
provide only a formal set of "findings of fact and conclusions of law,',i3
In the common law trial, the trier of fact has the "whole picture"
prior to proceeding to judgment. This different appreciation of the
12 S'et'id
i 3 Fed. R Ci\·. P 52.
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evidence must have perceptual. intellectual and normative significance,
Reflection on those dimensions must await another day.
X, The Imperative to Go Home
After submission of the evidence In the concentrated hearing, the
members of the jury want to adjourn and go home. To obtain their
release from official duty, they must reach a decision, after due
deliberation to be sure, but decision for sure. A hung jury is distressing
to the litigants, or at least one of them, but it is a complete waste as far as
most of the jurors arc concerned: If they are unable to reach decision,
their service has been in vain,
The contrast with some judicial proceedings is substantial, even
stark, Efficient judges, and there are many, want to receive a case in
compact and focused fonn, and will rule promptly and firmly. But some
judges in many systems, and many judges in some systems, are not thus
efficient. Rather, they receive the evidence in leisurely and meandering
fashion, strung out over months or even years. And thereafter they may
take the case, in the American legal phrase, "under advisement." I am
told that in some civil law systems this period of official inaction,
supposedly one of deliberation, often persists for months or even years.
Lawyers in this country unfortunately have similar experience in
aspects of American procedure that do not involve a trial or concentrated
hearing on the merits, but rather some pretrial matter of limited scope. In
contemporary American procedure, a civil dispute resulting in an actual
trial is a relatively infrequent occurrence. Something over 95% of civil
cases, federal and state, are resolved short of trial.'" [nstead, most civil
litigation consists of pretrial maneuvering and chaffering by the
advocates, and pretrial motions and requests presented to the cOLlli.
These pretrial maneuvers typically involve issues of law concerning
procedure or the substantive law goveming the merits, particularly
disputes over discovery. Discovery disputes in turn often involve both
procedure and the merits.
In fact, as repolied by many lawyers and judges, contemporary
American civil litigation tends to be focused on a pivotal procedure, the
Motion for Summary Judgment. IS The issue in summary judgment is
having regard for all the discovery which has been obtained, whether
there is a "genuine issue of fact" remaining for detennination. In simpler
terms, the issue is whether there is disputed evidence that must be
14. See Th~ IIOIwrabk Patrick 1. Higginbotham, The Disuppearing Trial und Will'
We Should Carc. R\ND REV., Vol. 28. No. 2 (2004). amilaMe af
http://www.rand .or~ puh Iications/randrcviewlissues/sulTIlTIcr2004i2K. html.
15 Sec Fed. R Ci\. P 56.
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submitted to a jury for detemlination. If the summary judgment motion
is resolved in a determination that there is no such issue. judgment
follows accordingly. If it is resolved in a determination that there is such
an issue, the case theoretically will go to trial. In fact, most such cases
then are resolved by settlement. Only a small residue wi 1J actually go to
trial.
In light of this pattern, American lawyers often suffer the same
experience as their civil law counterpalis: serial hearings, not a
concentrated hearing, followed by long intervals before a judicial
resolution is obtained.
Xl. Conclusion
The mechanism of jury trial has attractive mechanical features. In a
jury trial the issues and the evidence must be presented clearly and
simply, because jurors are amateurs in their adjudicative task. The
evidence must be presented to a jury in a concentrated hearing because
the jurors, being amateurs, have other vocations and personal affairs to
which they must retum. The jury must reach a decision immediately
after the hearing because their adjudicative authority continues only
while they function together as such. Thereafter they adjourn sine die.
These mechanics continue to be attractive features of jury trial. At
the same time, the tendency in contemporary American civil litigation is
toward disposition through pretrial motion practice. in serial hearings
dealing with subcategories of the dispute, which foreclose jury trial in a
high fraction of the cases. In this respect, American civil procedure
appears to be losing slIch mechanical advantage as jury trial affords, and
is converging toward the model in nonjury systems. lh The Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure accommodate both.
J 6 ('ol1ljJul"e John H. LIIlt!bCJJl. The C;el"lJliIll .4dlwllage II! ('il;/ P!"f)(edure. :'2 L
C!l1. L R/\ gn (19X5)
